Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note

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Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note

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Abstract

This article suggests that one possible function of imagery is its role as a mediator of self-awareness and its significance in the acquisition of self- information. Sparse allusions of a relation between imagery and self-awareness have been mentioned before, but no real attempt to account for the nature of the link has been undertaken. The following hypothesis is put forward: some cognitive processes are capable of internally reproducing social mechanisms responsible for self-awareness. One such mechanism is the opportunity to see oneself as one is seen by others. It is postulated that imagery internalizes this social mechanism because mental images empower us to literally see ourselves acting (or having behaved) in given ways as others could see (or have seen) us acting. When one mentally sees oneself behaving in a given fashion, one is self-aware; furthermore, when one reflects on past behaviors by using mental images, one can deduct aspects of one's past functioning from what is internally seen, that is, acquire self- information and build a self-concept. The importance for mental images to have in their content the organism's body image (especially one's facial features) is underlined, and experiences with self-reflecting devices (e.g., mirrors) are presumed to be crucial in that respect.

Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note

Imagery, the phenomenon of visual experiences in the absence of any visual stimulus from the outside world, involves complex issues that have been subject to considerable theorizing for at least one hundred years, and to scientific research for about seventy years (Richardson, 1983). One first ought to be impressed by the richness and diversity of this domain, as the few following representative examples illustrate. Up to ten major theories have been put forward to explain the nature and function of mental images (see Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983). The existence of three types of mental images have been proposed: dream, memory, and hallucinatory imagery (McKellar, 1972). Mental images can be measured in a variety of ways, including the assessment of imagery ability (which might involve a mental manipulation of spatial relationships), the administration of questionnaires or self-report inventories, the use of thought-sampling methods, and the probe of subjects' mental experiences in a relatively unstructured fashion (see Sheehan, Ashton & White, 1983). With these techniques and others, individual differences in the vividness of mental images, for example, or in the ability to manipulate mental images, have been identified (see Marks, 1972; Morris & Hampson, 1983; Paivio, 1971). Visual phenomenon induced by hallucinogens or experienced in altered states of consciousness have been extensively examined (see Barber, 1971; Holt, 1972). And numerous clinical applications based on imagery have also been designed--for instance, the treatment of depression, insomnia, sexual malfunctioning and chronic pain (Sheikh & Jordan, 1983), through evoking adaptive images, and monitoring as well as modifying maladaptive images (Meichenbaum, 1978).

It thus appears that mental images play a significant role in a number of basic psychological activities, including memory, learning, initiating action, reverie, perception, motivation, creative imagination, and emotion (Meltzer, 1991; Morris & Hampson, 1983; Sheikh, 1983). Despite this impressive body of work, I wish to submit that one possible function of imagery has not received the attention it deserves: its role as a mediator of self-awareness and its importance in the acquisition of self-information. The general context into which this proposal falls concerns the identification of the underlying cognitive processes the self uses in reflecting upon itself. In social experimental psychology, "self-awareness" is defined as the capacity to become the object of one's attention (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The individual whose attention is self-directed is said to be in a state of self-awareness, that is, in a state in which he or she can observe his or her own characteristics and behaviors. There also exists a natural disposition to self-focus more or less frequently, called "self- consciousness" (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975).

Over 300 articles have been published in that field these last twenty years (Franzoi, 1986), and yet, as Gibbons (1990) points out, little is known about what cognitively happens when the individual is self-aware. Through what cognitive processes do we have access to the content of our current subjective experience? How does the self acquire information about itself? What takes place when the individual examines, analyzes himself or herself, reflects or focuses on himself or herself? One cognitive process the self uses when reflecting upon itself and forming a self-concept is self-talk (Morin, 1995a; Morin & Joshi, 1990; Morin & Everett, 1990). The individual in a state of self-awareness, more often than not, actually talks to himself or herself and uses words to describe to himself or herself his or her personal characteristics, behaviors, emotions, sensations, motivations, and so on. Also, evidence suggests that highly self-conscious persons, compared with low self-conscious individuals, extensively talk to themselves about themselves (Morin, 1995b; Morin, Everett, Turcotte & Tardif, 1993; Siegrist, 1995).

Now, my proposal here is fairly straightforward: we also frequently examine ourselves by using imagery. Indeed, Turner, Scheier, Carver and Ickes (1978) found that highly self-conscious people report using imagery as a means of introspection. Barrios and Singer (1981-82) also found comparable results using different measures of imagery. And Gold and Henderson (1981) observed moderate correlations between frequency of daydreaming (a form of imagery) and self-consciousness. Empirical evidence in support to the existence of a link between imagery and self-awareness is limited--but it should be noted that indirect mentions to such a relation can repeatedly be found in the literature.(1) For instance, Suler (1990, p. 199) proposes that "Images serve as internal reference points for the sense of continuity of one's experience of self and objects across time." Tower (1983) suggests that role-playing through mental imagery would increase sensitivity to facial and sensory cues, including awareness of one's own affect as well as a complementary articulated body concept. Cartwright (1980) believes that the notion of identity is partially represented in a set of self- images: "A person may generate any number of self-images. Some of these would refer to common activities, some to past experiences, some to some capacities not yet fully displayed, some to future actions and experiences, some to role enactments, some to identifications, feelings and moods. The set of self-images that an individual generates at a particular time constitutes one partial predictor of that person's sense of identity at that time" (p. 4).

What these and other allusions(2) to the existence of a link between imagery and self-awareness lack is an explanation as to why mental images lead to--or mediate--self-awareness. In other words, if we assume that the link does exist, what is the nature of the relation between imagery and self-awareness? I propose that human beings possess "self-representational processes" capable of internally reproducing social mechanisms responsible for self-awareness (Morin, 1993; Morin & DeBlois, 1989). One such mechanism from which self-awareness derives is the opportunity to see oneself as one is seen by others (Mead, 1934). More precisely, being confronted to different ways of thinking, feeling and behaving first allows the individual to perceive that he or she is endowed with unique qualities; this motivates him or her to take others' perspective in order to gain an objective vision of himself or herself. Then self-awareness (i.e., self-observation and the resulting acquisition of self- information) is reached. As Mead suggested, "Individuals are able to view themselves as objects only by imaginatively taking the role, or standpoint, of others and viewing themselves 'through the eyes of others'" (Meltzer, 1991, p. 24). Obviously, imagery might represent a cognitive process by which this social mechanism could be internalized. (Note that inner speech too is likely to serve the same function.) As Kitamura puts it (1985, p. 92), "(...) imagery is perhaps a product of our desire or need to pick up certain information about our total situation and ourselves from the viewpoint of the other person".

Let me be more specific. Mental images empower us to literally see ourselves acting (or having behaved) this or that way as others could see (or have seen) us acting. When one mentally sees oneself behaving in a given fashion (for example, a mental image of the person acting in a foolish way strikes him or her as he or she is actually emitting inappropriate behaviors), one is self-focusing--one is self-aware. And when one reflects on past behaviors by using mental images of oneself (for example, remembering how one acted in a given situation), not only one is still reflecting upon oneself, but one also has the opportunity to deduct aspects of one's past functioning from what is internally seen. In other words, the person can perceive that he or she was arrogant, or shy, or nervous, or intense, etc.--all these representing more or less stable self-aspects. Thus, mental images could mediate self- awareness, lead to an acquisition of self-information, and ultimately (together with other self-representational processes and social feedback), participate in the formation of a self- concept.

Now, this is not to say that imagery allows the person to have access to all types of self-information. Even though in some cases "one picture is worth a thousand words", I would suggest that imagery is powerless in conveying more abstract self-aspects--for instance, emotions, values, beliefs, motivations, or sensations. In other words, I hardly see how mental images could inform a person of his or her emotions--surely verbal labels (i.e., self-talk) must be more efficient in that respect. My point is: Who ever "saw" an emotion or a sensation? I thus offer that imagery is more adequate in making a person aware of more public self-aspects, as opposed to more private ones. Private self-aspects designate covert self-aspects such as moods, motives, mental processes, desires, and so on; public self-aspects, on the other hand, refer to an individual's observable behaviors and visible physical characteristics (Buss, 1980)--things that can be seen by others and that can also be readily translated into mental images. A partial support to this view comes from a study by Lord (1980), which showed that propositional, verbally or semantically encoded knowledge about the self (inner speech) are more effective as memory aids for information about the self than "visual encoding" (imagery); the later would be more effective as memory aids for information about others.

So it is doubtful that imagery can directly capture the essence of more abstract self-information--but repeatedly "seeing" stable behavioral patterns might. Other persons can conclude that we possess some given attitudes or values by frequently observing us behaving in a typical manner; people can infer what others feel by examining facial expressions. I think that similar inferences about "unobservable" personal characteristics can also be reached with imagery. If, in retrospect, someone regularly "sees" oneself blushing during social interactions (a public self-dimension), one can conclude that he or she feels unconfortable with other persons (a private event). Or if an individual frequently "sees" himself or herself behaving as a strict person (public), he or she will conceivably perceive himself or herself as a moral person (private). Inner speech is likely to be activated in order to label these new self- informations--we can thus postulate that imagery and self-talk work together and are complementary processes. So rather private self-aspects can be deduced by attending to public behavior, be it through direct observation or imagery.

So far I have discussed the possibility that imagery might represent a cognitive process involved in self-awareness, self-consciousness, and the formation of the self-concept. The latter refers to the perception a person has of himself or herself in the present (L'Ecuyer, 1975). Note that other types of self-perception exist and that imagery is likely to participate in their elaborations as well. For example, self-schematas consist in coherent and organized sets of self-information that are restricted to specific self-aspects (Markus, 1977)--one's look, or intelligence, or behavior at work, and so on. The self-concept is actually made up of networks of self- schematas. Now, since imagery is probably involved in the construction of the self- concept, it is only logical to assume that it is also active in the construction of self- schematas. Possible selves are another type of self-perception--the different thoughts a person has of himself or herself in the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Possible selves are perceptions of what one wants to become, might become, or is afraid of becoming. Clearly, such mental representations need cognitive processes to be articulated--I believe that one such process involves imagery. It is highly plausible that the person who contemplates possible self-developmental avenues (e.g., becoming rich and famous, or fat, or old) will form specific mental pictures of himself or herself being in these fictive future situations and states. Actually, one can even propose that it is probably impossible to do so without using imagery.

For imagery to be functional as a self-representational process, I would suggest that it must have in its content a decisive ingredient, that is, the organism's body image (Morin & DeBlois, 1989). Images of one's physical self are called "autoscopic imagery" (Kitamura, 1985). In that respect, one's facial features must be important because they are probably our most unique physical characteristics--those features that can best represent our own identity. Without a clear mental picture of ourselves to contemplate, there is no need to evoke the possibility of oneself internally seeing oneself acting or having behaved in a particular fashion. Our experience with mirrors must be crucial in acquiring this decisive ingredient. In the light of the hypothesis put forward here, it is tempting to propose that the absence of an experience with mirrors (as in tribal groups in Nigeria [Olowu, 1984]), or with any other self- reflecting devises (e.g., photographs and videos), could diminish one's capacity for self- awareness. By the same token, I would submit that individuals born blind are deprived of an introspection tool. Also, allowing some organisms to frequently see themselves in front of a mirror (as Gallup [1985] has repeatedly done with primates) might provide them with a new tool for introspection (Morin & DeBlois, 1989).

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Author's note.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Alain Morin, Ph. D, 823 Nouvelle-Orléans, Ste-Foy (Québec), CANADA G1X-3J4.

Footnotes

1 Note that imagery has also been linked to consciousness on several occasions. See Ahsen (1988), Marks (1977), Mandler (1984), and Morris and Hampson (1983).

2 See Desmer Feinberg- Moss & Oatley (1990), Farrimond (1990), Kahn & Greenberg (1980), Kuiken & Mathews (1986), Leuner (1977), Richardson & McAndrew (1990), Roland (1981), and Rollins (1989).

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